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A political business cycle with boundedly rational agents
In: Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Volkswirtschaftlichen Seminar der Universität Göttingen 101
Central bank's partisan preferences and the political business cycle
In: Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Volkswirtschaftlichen Seminar der Universität Göttingen 86
Die Bedeutung der Zentralbankunabhängigkeit für den politischen Konjunkturzyklus
In: Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Volkswirtschaftlichen Seminar der Universität Göttingen 85
Changes of the payoff matrix in repeated prisoner's dilemma and their effects on the limit sets of evolution: a note
In: Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Volkswirtschaftlichen Seminar der Universität Göttingen 69
Das verschmähte Instrument der (Fernstraßen- oder City‑) Maut
In: List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik, Band 46, Heft 2, S. 213-225
ISSN: 2364-3943
ZusammenfassungSeit langem werden von Ökonomen Straßenbenutzungsgebühren als Instrument gegen Verkehrsstaus empfohlen. In der Praxis gibt es jedoch nur wenige Anwendungen. In diesem Artikel werden die unterschiedliche Stautechnologien und die jeweils adäquate Maut identifiziert. Widerstände, die einer Maut entgegenstehen, und Möglichkeiten, sie zu überwinden, werden aufgezeigt. Es ist an der Zeit, den Einheitlichen Europäischen Mautdienst zu realisieren und einen Rechtsrahmen in Deutschland zu schaffen, der es Städten erlaubt, Maut zu erheben.
Nichtintendierte Effekte einer Helmpflicht für Fahrradfahrer in Deutschland
In: List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik, Band 40, Heft 3, S. 322-331
ISSN: 2364-3943
Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots
Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g < 1-or-lose-it rule.
BASE
Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots
Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g < 1-or-lose-it rule. ; Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g < 1-or-lose-it rule.
BASE
Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots
Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports refer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport profits increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The profit-maximizing rule is a use-it-or-lose-it rule. ; Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports refer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport profits increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The profit-maximizing rule is a use-it-or-lose-it rule.
BASE
A MODEL OF AN OPPORTUNISTIC‐PARTISAN POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE
In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Band 53, Heft 2, S. 242-252
ISSN: 1467-9485
ABSTRACTAccording to political business cycle theory, separate opportunistic and partisan approaches exist. It is obvious, as seen from theoretical and empirical points of view, that politicians aim for both opportunistic as well as partisan goals. This paper presents a model of a pre‐election political business cycle that manifests an indication of competence and a post‐election political business cycle that occurs because of the uncertainty of an election's winner monetary policy. In the pre‐election period competent governments expand the economy. The post‐election cycle depends on whether a leftist or a conservative government is in power in the pre‐election period, and if they are re‐elected or not.
A political business cycle with boundedly rational agents
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 39-52
A Political Business Cycle with Boundedly Rational Agents
In: European journal of political economy, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 39-52
ISSN: 0176-2680
This paper shows that being "rational" is not crucial for rational opportunistic political business cycle theory. Partisan & independent central banks initiate a political business cycle even if voters & central banks adapt to positive rewards. I consider a central bank that is independent but has party preferences. Voters prefer competence, but do not know the government's competence. Therefore, the central bank signals competence through an expansive monetary policy. The approach used is a simulation of artificial adaptive agents in an evolutionary programming setup. In contrast to a model with complete rationality, the convergence of the evolutionary path is not unique in the simulation. Political, nonpolitical & nonequilibria (in a game theoretical sense) coexist. Coordination occurs frequently. 8 Figures, 39 References. Adapted from the source document.
A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 503-516